CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE
复制标题
DOI：
10.1093/mind/102.406.263
复制
发表时间：
1993-04-01
期刊：
影响因子：
1.8
通讯作者：
DRETSKE, F
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
DRETSKE, F
这是电子书的一部分，网址为doi：10.7551/mitpress/7111.001。根据它，一种精神状态是有意识的，只要意识之光照在它上面--从而使人意识到它。1对于像Dennett(1991)这样的人来说，这听起来也很困惑，他们虽然拒绝戏剧隐喻(以及他们鼓励的聚光灯图像)，但支持一种关于心理现象的第一人称操作主义，这种心理现象将有意识的心理状态与那些可以报道的心理状态联系起来，因此，记者必然意识到有意识的心理状态。然而，对于一个人没有意识到的有意识的体验这一概念，没有什么混淆或矛盾的。理解有意识体验的本质的第一步是理解为什么会这样。
This is a portion of the eBook at doi: 10.7551/mitpress/7111.001. 0001 according to which a mental state is conscious in so far as the light of consciousness shines on it—thus making one conscious of it. 1 It will also sound confused to those like Dennett (1991) who, though rejecting theatre metaphors (and the spotlight images they encourage), espouse a kind of first person operationalism about mental phenomena that links conscious mental states to those that can be reported and of which, therefore, the reporter is necessarily aware of having. There is, however, nothing confused or contradictory about the idea of a conscious experience that one is not conscious of having. The first step in understanding the nature of conscious experience is understanding why this is so.