Metaphysische Unzufriedenheit
Metaphysische Unzufriedenheit
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形而上学的自由
DOI：
10.1515/dzph-2019-0004
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Barry Stroud
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Barry Stroud
摘要我们在对我们所生活的世界的形而上学反思中寻求什么？康德认为这种冲动是“某种不仅仅是对知识的渴望”。在这里，我提出这样一个问题：我们是否能够从我们对我们所知道的关于世界的事物的认识中获得足够的“距离”，以便对那些似乎是我们对世界和我们自己作为世界中的主体的概念的不可或缺的成分的形而上学地位得出令人满意的独立判断。我们是否能够始终如一地解释某些真理为真的必然性，或者我们相信某些事件之间的因果关系，或者我们赋予某些物体或行为的价值，而不是真正独立于我们说话、思考和行动的事物的一部分？问题是，我们是否以及如何能够在继续以我们的方式理解我们自己和世界的同时，始终如一地接受这种明显消极的形而上学结论。
Abstract What do we seek in metaphysical reflection on the world we live in? Kant thought the urge is “something more than a mere thirst for knowledge.” Here I introduce the question whether we could ever gain sufficient “distance” from our knowing the things we know about the world to arrive at satisfyingly independent verdicts about the metaphysical status of what appear to be indispensable ingredients of our conception of the world and of ourselves as agents within it. Could we consistently explain the necessity with which certain truths are true, or the causal connections we believe to hold between certain events, or the values we ascribe to certain objects or actions, as not really part of the way things are independently of our speaking and thinking and acting in the ways we do? The question is whether and how we could consistently accept such apparently negative metaphysical conclusions while continuing to understand ourselves and the world in the ways we do.