Tunneling or Value Addition? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups
Tunneling or Value Addition? Evidence from Mergers by Korean Business Groups
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DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.246621
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发表时间：
2000-10
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Kee‐Hong Bae;Jun-Koo Kang;Jin-Mo Kim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Kee‐Hong Bae;Jun-Koo Kang;Jin-Mo Kim
新兴市场的企业集团有可能产生价值或代理问题。使用韩国合并，我们调查的性质，在新兴市场的企业集团，并研究韩国企业集团（财阀）是否增加价值，他们的成员公司或提供控股股东的机会，财富转移（隧道）。我们发现，财阀附属公司，表现良好的合并前实现显着负公告回报。我们还发现，财阀投标人谁收购表现不佳的目标，在同一组和/或集中股权的所有者-管理者的经验显着负异常回报。然而，这些类型的合并对集团内其他公司的投资组合的市场价值有显著的积极影响。我们的研究结果支持隧道的观点，即属于企业集团的公司不太注意单个公司价值的最大化，并作出收购决策，是有利于只有控股股东。
Business groups in emerging markets have the potential to create either value or agency problems. Using Korean mergers, we investigate the nature of business groups in emerging markets and examine whether Korean business groups (chaebols) add value to their member firms or provide the controlling shareholders with an opportunity for wealth transfer (tunneling). We show that chaebol-affiliated firms that performed well prior to the merger realize significantly negative announcement returns. We also find that chaebol bidders who acquired poorly performing targets within the same group and/or had concentrated equity ownership by owner-managers experience significantly negative abnormal returns. These types of mergers, however, have a significantly positive effect on the market value of the portfolio of other firms in the group. Our results support the tunneling view that firms belonging to business groups pay less attention to the maximization of individual firm value and make takeover decisions that are beneficial to only controlling shareholders.