A window to the structure of the mind.
A window to the structure of the mind.
复制标题
心灵结构的窗口。
DOI：
10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02003-x
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发表时间：
2002
影响因子：
19.9
通讯作者：
Woodward,AmandaL.
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Wilson,Camille;Woodward,AmandaL.
模仿长期以来一直引起研究人性的学生的兴趣，因为它不仅普遍存在于人类生活中，而且是连接个人思想与其所生活的社会和文化背景的渠道。最近，认知和知觉、认知神经科学、人类发展和比较认知领域的研究者对模仿的兴趣重新兴起[1]。这些领域的许多突破性发现得出了一个共同的结论：模仿及其发生的过程为心灵提供了一个独特的窗口。在这种协同作用的基础上，梅尔佐夫和普林茨编写了一本书，既说明了人们对模仿的兴趣日益广泛，又提炼了跨学科出现的核心问题。这些问题涉及行动表现的水平以及将自我产生的行动与观察到的他人行动联系起来的系统。整本书中出现的一个重要见解是，可以在各个层面上模仿行为，从特定的运动模式到指导行动的更抽象的目标。这一见解为关于再现动作的特定运动细节是否、何时以及为何至关重要的争论提供了信息（参见参考文献 [2, 3]，以及 Byrne、Gattis 和同事、Meltzoff 和 Whiten 的章节）。这一见解还表明模仿可以用来研究动作表征。书中的许多章节都说明了这种方法，并得出这样的结论：动作的表现超出了运动模式的水平：各个作者证明，成人和儿童（Bekkering、Gattis 及其同事、Prinz、Vogt）、婴儿（Meltzoff）和非人类灵长类动物（Byrne、Whiten）根据其目标结构来表示动作。正如特沃斯基及其同事所阐明的，以目标为导向的行动具有丰富的结构。这种结构的某些方面在个体发育的不同点、不同的物种或不同的情况下有所体现。本书对动作表征的这些更具体的方面提供了初步见解，包括基于对演员目标的分析灵活解释相同运动模式的能力（Decety、Gattis 和同事，Prinz）、对动作的层次和顺序结构的敏感性（Byrne、Whiten）以及预测不完整动作结果的能力（Jellema 和同事、Meltzoff）。模仿依赖于将自己的行为与他人的行为联系起来的能力。整本书都有一致的证据表明对这一过程的重要见解——观察到的行为和自我产生的行为通过共同的神经认知表征结合在一起。优雅的行为研究表明，产生特定的动作和感知该动作会利用一些相同的表征资源（Bekkering、Prinz、Vogt）。此外，最近的研究结果揭示了对观察到的行为和自我产生的行为做出反应的神经基质（所谓的“镜像神经元”）（Decety、Rizzolatti 及其同事）。这些发现为感知-行动关系、自愿行为的产生和神经结构提供了重要的见解。至关重要的是，他们还表明模仿可以直接由这些共同表征的激活产生，不需要翻译来解释感知的动作和执行的动作之间的匹配。如果对所有动作都表达这种激活，那么这种激活将是适应不良的。几位作者提出了调节模仿行为的机制（Bekkering、Decety、Kinsbourne、Rizzolatti 及其同事），还有几位作者考虑了这种调节未能发生的情况——婴儿期（Decety、Kinsbourne、Heimann）、自闭症患者（Nadel、Whiten）以及某些……
Imitation has long intrigued students of human nature, because it is both pervasive in human life and a channel connecting the individual mind to the social and cultural context in which it lives. There is a recent resurgence of interest in imitation among investigators of cognition and perception, cognitive neuroscience, human development and comparative cognition [1]. A number of groundbreaking discoveries across these domains have led to the converging conclusion that imitation and the processes by which it occurs offer a unique window to the mind. Building on this synergy, Meltzoff and Prinz have assembled a volume that both illustrates the growing breadth of interest in imitation and distills the core questions that surface across disciplines. These questions concern the level at which action is represented and the system that relates self-produced actions to the observed actions of others. A critical insight emerging throughout the book is that behavior can be imitated at various levels, from specific motor patterns to the more abstract goals that guide action. This insight informs debates about whether, when and why reproducing the specific motor details of an action are crucial (see Refs [2, 3], as well as the chapters by Byrne, Gattis and colleagues, Meltzoff, and Whiten). This insight also shows that imitation can be used to investigate action representations. Many chapters of the book illustrate this method, converging on the conclusion that actions are represented beyond the level of motor patterns: the various authors demonstrate that adults and children (Bekkering, Gattis and colleagues, Prinz, Vogt), infants (Meltzoff), and non-human primates (Byrne, Whiten) represent action in terms of its goal structure. As Tversky and colleagues elucidate, goal-directed action is richly structured. Some aspects of this structure are represented at different points in ontogeny, in different species, or in different situations. The book provides initial insights into these more specific aspects of action representation, including the ability to interpret the same motor pattern flexibly based on an analysis of the actor’s goals (Decety, Gattis and colleagues, Prinz), sensitivity to the hierarchical and sequential structure of action (Byrne, Whiten), and the ability to anticipate the outcome of an incomplete action (Jellema and colleagues, Meltzoff). Imitation rests on the ability to relate one’s own actions to the actions of others. Throughout the book there is converging evidence for an important insight into this process–that observed and self-produced behaviors are united by common neurocognitive representations. Elegant behavioral research has shown that producing a particular action and perceiving that action draw on some of the same representational resources (Bekkering, Prinz, Vogt). Moreover, recent findings have revealed neural substrates (so-called ‘mirror neurons’) that respond to both observed actions and self-produced actions (Decety, Rizzolatti and colleagues). These findings yield important insights into perception–action relations, the production of voluntary behavior, and neural architecture. Crucially, they also indicate that imitation can result directly from the activation of these common representations, requiring no translation to account for the match between actions perceived and actions performed. This activation would be maladaptive if it were expressed for all actions. Several authors propose mechanisms for the modulation of imitative behavior (Bekkering, Decety, Kinsbourne, Rizzolatti and colleagues), and several consider instances in which this modulation fails to occur–in infancy (Decety, Kinsbourne, Heimann), in autism (Nadel, Whiten), and in certain cases of …