Procreative Beneficence, Obligation, and Eugenics
Procreative Beneficence, Obligation, and Eugenics
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DOI：
10.1186/1746-5354-3-3-43
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发表时间：
2007-12-15
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Sparrow R
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作者：
Sparrow R
朱利安·萨武莱斯库2001年发表的论文《生育慈善：为什么我们应该选择最好的孩子》的论点在许多方面存在缺陷。萨武莱斯库混淆了理由和义务，并在父母有理由希望孩子得到最好的东西和更激进的说法之间模棱两可，前者声称他们在道德上有义务试图培养出尽可能好的孩子。萨武莱斯库提供了一个表面上不可信的父母义务的描述，因为即使是最好的父母通常也不能做他们认为对孩子最好的事情，更不用说实际上对孩子最好的事情了。试图对最好的人类生活做出合理的解释时所遇到的深刻的哲学困难，构成了反对萨武莱斯库结论的另一个独立理由。萨武莱斯库的论点还要求父母成为种族主义和恐同(以及其他形式的)压迫的同谋，这是拒绝它的另一个理由。从萨武列斯库的论点中去掉模棱两可的说法，让我们看到，与萨武列斯库承认的相比，选择“最好的孩子”的义务与“旧的”优生学有更多的相似之处。
The argument of Julian Savulescu's 2001 paper, "Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children" is flawed in a number of respects. Savulescu confuses reasons with obligations and equivocates between the claim that parents have some reason to want the best for their children and the more radical claim that they are morally obligated to attempt to produce the best child possible. Savulescu offers a prima facie implausible account of parental obligation, as even the best parents typically fail to do everything they think would be best for their children let alone everything that is in fact best for their children. The profound philosophical difficulties which beset the attempt to formulate a plausible account of the best human life constitute a further independent reason to resile from Savulescu's conclusion. Savulescu's argument also requires parents to become complicit with racist and homophobic (and other forms of) oppression, which is yet another reason to reject it. Removing the equivocation from Savulescu's argument allows us to see that the assertion of an obligation to choose the "best child" has much more in common with the "old" eugenics than Savulescu acknowledges.