Acoustics to the Rescue: Physical Key Inference Attack Revisited
Acoustics to the Rescue: Physical Key Inference Attack Revisited
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发表时间：
2021
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通讯作者：
Soundarya Ramesh;Rui Xiao;Anindya Maiti;Jong Taek Lee;Harini Ramprasad;Ananda Kumar;Murtuza Jadliwala-Murtuza
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作者：
Soundarya Ramesh;Rui Xiao;Anindya Maiti;Jong Taek Lee;Harini Ramprasad;Ananda Kumar;Murtuza Jadliwala-Murtuza
撬锁和撞钥匙是对传统弹子门锁最常见的攻击。然而，这些方法需要在整个攻击过程中对锁进行物理访问，从而增加了攻击者的怀疑和被抓住的机会。为了克服这一挑战，我们提出了 Keynergy，这是一种隐秘的离线攻击，通过大幅扩展和改进仅利用密钥的静态图像的先前工作来推断密钥比特（或秘密）。 Keynergy 有效地利用了受害者插入钥匙时固有的可听见的“咔嗒”声，以及受害者拿着钥匙的视频片段，以推断受害者钥匙的咬合情况。我们通过概念验证实施和真实世界实验来评估 Keynergy，其中参与者在总共 75 个按键上执行多次按键插入，并使用放置在不同距离的不同类型麦克风录制相关音频。我们证明，仅通过基于声学的方法，Keynergy 就能实现约 75% 的平均减排率。当我们将声学和视频结合在一起时，Keynergy 将 8% 的键（即测试的 75 个键中的 6 个键）的键空间减少到低于 10 个键。
Lock picking and key bumping are the most common attacks on traditional pin tumbler door locks. However, these approaches require physical access to the lock throughout the attack, increasing suspicion and chances of the attacker getting caught. To overcome this challenge, we propose Keynergy, a stealthy offline attack that infers key bittings (or secret) by substantially extending and improving prior work that only utilizes a still image of the key. Keynergy effectively utilizes the inherent audible “clicks” due to a victim’s key insertion, together with video footage of the victim holding the key, in order to infer the victim’s key’s bittings. We evaluate Keynergy via a proof-of-concept implementation and real-world experiments comprising of participants that perform multiple key insertions across a total of 75 keys with the related audio recorded using different microphone types placed at varying distances. We demonstrate that Keynergy achieves an average reduction rate of around 75% with an acoustics-based approach alone. When we combine both acoustics and video together, Keynergy obtains a reduced keyspace below ten keys for 8% of the keys (i.e., six keys out of 75 keys tested).