Insurance for Good Losers and the Survival of Chile's Concertación
Insurance for Good Losers and the Survival of Chile's Concertación
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为好失败者提供保险和智利协调组织的生存
DOI：
10.1111/j.1548-2456.2005.tb00307.x
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发表时间：
2005
影响因子：
1.9
通讯作者：
Peter M. Siavelis
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
John M. Carey;Peter M. Siavelis
在智利从军事统治向民主过渡的过程中，奥古斯托·皮诺切特（Augusto Pinochet）政府为智利留下了一部独特的选举法，根据该法，所有立法席位都在两人选区内竞争。这一规则的一个关键含义是，为了确保立法多数，联盟必须将其最强大的候选人放在最不稳定的选举名单上。这就造成了联盟和政治家之间的利益分歧。智利最大的联盟-执政联盟-解决了这一困境，为那些代表联盟接受个人政治风险的落选的国会候选人提供了任命职位。这项研究认为，这种保险制度提供了关键的胶水，以保持联盟在一起，因为智利的过渡到民主在1990年。最近选举环境的变化可能威胁到执政联盟对维持这一非正式机构的任命职位的控制。在谈判2005年立法选举联盟候选人名单的过程中，这可能会危及执政联盟的凝聚力。
Abstract In the transition from military rule to democracy, the government of Augusto Pinochet bequeathed to Chile a unique electoral law by which all legislative seats are contested in two-member districts. A key implication of this rule is that in order to secure legislative majorities, coalitions have to put their strongest candidates in the most precarious electoral list positions. This generates a divergence of interests between coalitions and politicians. Chile's largest coalition, the Concertación, has resolved the dilemma by providing appointed posts to unsuccessful congressional candidates who accept personal political risk on the coalition's behalf. This study argues that this insurance system has provided the critical glue to hold the coalition together since Chile's transition to democracy in 1990. Recent changes in the electoral environment could threaten the Concertación's control over the appointed posts that have sustained this informal institution. This could jeopardize the Concertación's cohesion during the process of negotiating coalition candidate lists for the 2005 legislative elections.