Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance
Can Pay Regulation Kill? Panel Data Evidence on the Effect of Labor Markets on Hospital Performance
复制标题
薪酬监管能杀人吗？
DOI：
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发表时间：
2008
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
A. Stengel
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Jacqueline Lohmiller;N. Schäffeler;S. Zipfel;A. Stengel
在许多部门，异质地域劳动力市场的薪酬被规定为平等。当有竞争力的外部工资高于规定工资时，质量可能会下降。我们利用来自英国医院人口的面板数据，这些医院的护士监管薪酬在全国范围内基本持平。根据急诊心脏病发作的医院死亡人数来衡量，较高的外部工资显着恶化了医院质量。外部工资增加 10% 会导致死亡率增加 7%。此外，该法规还增加了公共医疗保健系统的总死亡率。
In many sectors, pay is regulated to be equal across heterogeneous geographical labor markets. When the competitive outside wage is higher than the regulated wage, there are likely to be falls in quality. We exploit panel data from the population of English hospitals in which regulated pay for nurses is essentially flat across the country. Higher outside wages significantly worsen hospital quality as measured by hospital deaths for emergency heart attacks. A 10 percent increase in the outside wage is associated with a 7 percent increase in death rates. Furthermore, the regulation increases aggregate death rates in the public health care system.