Fixed-fee vs. royalty licensing under asymmetric demand information
Fixed-fee vs. royalty licensing under asymmetric demand information
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需求信息不对称下的固定费用与特许权使用费许可
DOI：
10.1111/manc.12378
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发表时间：
2021
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Yue Li and Takashi Yanagawa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
鈴木健介;土井康裕;Yue Li and Takashi Yanagawa
当市场外拥有降低生产成本的新技术的研发企业与市场内从事生产活动的垄断企业所掌握的市场规模信息不对称时，生产企业就有动力缩小其市场规模以减少许可费用。在不存在信息不对称的情况下，固定费用许可对于研发公司来说是可取的，但特许权使用费许可以及费用和特许权使用费的混合可以作为解决信息不对称的一种手段。本研究使用动态信号模型表明，当新技术水平较大或较小时，采用固定费用许可，而当新技术水平适中时，则采用特许权使用费许可。
When there is asymmetry in the market size information held by an R&D firm outside a market that possesses new technology for lowering production costs, along with a monopoly firm that engages in production activities inside the market, the producing firm has an incentive to make its market size look smaller to reduce licensing fees. Fixed‐fee licensing is desirable for R&D firms in the absence of information asymmetry, but royalty licensing and a mixture of fees and royalties can work as a means to resolve information asymmetry. Using a dynamic model of signaling, this study shows that fixed‐fee licensing is adopted when the level of a new technology is large or small, while royalty licensing is adopted when the level is moderate.