Truth and Conventional Implicature
Truth and Conventional Implicature
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真理与传统含义
作者：
S. Barker
T模式的所有实例都是可断言的吗？我认为他们不是。究其原因，一种语言中存在着传统的含义。传统含义是句子可以具有的基于规则的内容的一个组成部分，但它对句子的真值条件没有任何贡献。有人可能会认为，传统的含义就像一个力运算符。但它不是，因为它可以进入逻辑运算符的范围。由此可见，一个句子的语义内容不是简单地由它的真值条件内容给出的。因此，并不是T模式的所有实例在相关意义上都是可断言的。因此，有一个强有力的理由来反对关于真理的各种引用和通货紧缩的真理条件语义学。
Are all instances of the T‐schema assertable? I argue that they are not. The reason is the presence of conventional implicature in a language. Conventional implicature is meant to be a component of the rule‐based content that a sentence can have, but it makes no contribution to the sentence's truth‐conditions. One might think that a conventional implicature is like a force operator. But it is not, since it can enter into the scope of logical operators. It follows that the semantic content of a sentence is not given simply by its truth‐conditional content. So not all instances of the T‐schema are assertable in the relevant sense. Consequently, there is a strong case to be made against truth‐conditional semantics of the disquotational variety and deflationism about truth.