Exploration of Quantum Computer Power Side-Channels
Exploration of Quantum Computer Power Side-Channels
复制标题
量子计算机电源侧通道的探索
DOI：
10.48550/arxiv.2304.03315
复制
发表时间：
2023
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Jakub Szefer
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Chuan Xu;Ferhat Erata;Jakub Szefer
随着人们对量子计算的兴趣迅速增长，保护这些量子计算机免受各种物理攻击的重要性也在增长。不断增加的量子比特数和量子计算机保真度的提高，为这些计算机运行具有高度敏感知识产权的新颖算法的能力带来了巨大的希望。然而，在当今基于云的量子计算机环境中，用户缺乏对计算机的物理控制。物理攻击，例如数据中心内的恶意内部人员实施的攻击，可以用来提取有关这些计算机上执行的电路的敏感信息。事实上，这项工作首次表明，基于功率的侧信道攻击可以针对量子计算机进行部署。这种攻击可以用来恢复有关发送到这些计算机的控制脉冲的信息。通过分析这些控制脉冲，攻击者可以对电路的等效门级描述进行逆向工程，甚至可能对正在运行的秘密算法进行逆向工程。这项工作介绍了五种新类型的攻击，并使用基于云的量子计算机提供的控制脉冲信息对其进行评估。这项工作演示了如何和什么电路可以恢复，然后反过来如何抵御新演示的侧信道攻击量子计算机。
With the rapidly growing interest in quantum computing also grows the importance of securing these quantum computers from various physical attacks. Constantly increasing qubit counts and improvements to the fidelity of the quantum computers hold great promise for the ability of these computers to run novel algorithms with highly sensitive intellectual property. However, in today's cloud-based quantum computer setting, users lack physical control over the computers. Physical attacks, such as those perpetrated by malicious insiders in data centers, could be used to extract sensitive information about the circuits being executed on these computers. Indeed, this work shows for the first time that power-based side-channel attacks could be deployed against quantum computers. Such attacks can be used to recover information about the control pulses sent to these computers. By analyzing these control pulses, attackers can reverse-engineer the equivalent gate-level description of the circuits, and possibly even the secret algorithms being run. This work introduces five new types of attacks, and evaluates them using control pulse information available from cloud-based quantum computers. This work demonstrates how and what circuits could be recovered, and then in turn how to defend from the newly demonstrated side-channel attacks on quantum~computers.
登录
查看更多内容
影响因子：
6.7
作者：
McClean, Jarrod R.;Rubin, Nicholas C.;Babbush, Ryan
通讯作者：
Babbush, Ryan
DOI：
10.1145/3338906.3338913
发表时间：
2019-02
期刊：
Proceedings of the 2019 27th ACM Joint Meeting on European Software Engineering Conference and Symposium on the Foundations of Software Engineering
影响因子：
--
作者：
Jingbo Wang;Chungha Sung;Chao Wang
通讯作者：
Jingbo Wang;Chungha Sung;Chao Wang
多租户 FPGA 中的配电攻击
DOI：
10.1109/tvlsi.2020.3027711
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI
影响因子：
--
作者：
Provelengios, George;Holcomb, Daniel;Tessier, Russell
通讯作者：
Tessier, Russell
云 FPGA 攻击的功耗电路
DOI：
10.1109/fpl50879.2020.00046
发表时间：
2020
期刊：
2020 30th International Conference on Field-Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL
影响因子：
--
作者：
Provelengios, George;Holcomb, Daniel;Tessier, Russell
通讯作者：
Tessier, Russell