Part 2: Discipline
Part 2: Discipline
复制标题
第 2 部分：纪律
DOI：
10.1080/1357233042000306308
复制
发表时间：
2003
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Sam Depauw
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Sam Depauw
近年来，议会政党的凝聚力不断增强。尽管在国会中，政党领导层解决集体行动问题和降低交易成本的能力一直受到质疑，但在议会制度中，似乎没有什么值得怀疑的。因此，本文的目的是通过（i）合同设计、（ii）筛选和选择、（iii）监督和信息要求以及（iv）制度检查来追踪政党领导层在议会制度中确保政党团结的特殊能力。就这些能力对成员的影响不同而言，可以根据叛乱分子的身份来勾勒出他们的轮廓。显然，纪律很难用奖励和惩罚来解释。在法国和英国，派系和倾向或许是对异议的最有效预测，而在比利时，议会外政党的领导和详细的政策协议对成员的纪律有着重大影响。
In recent years the level of cohesion in parliamentary parties has continued to increase. Whereas in Congress the party leadership's capabilities to solve collective action problems and to reduce transaction costs have been in doubt, in parliamentary systems little seems to warrant such doubt. Therefore, the aim of this article is to trace the party leadership's particular capabilities to secure party unity in parliamentary systems by means of (i) contract design, (ii) screening and selection, (iii) monitoring and information requirements, and (iv) institutional checks. To the extent that these capabilities affect members differently, it is possible to sketch their contours on the basis of who the rebels are. It is apparent that discipline is not readily explained in terms of rewards and punishments. Factions and tendencies provide perhaps the most valid prediction for dissent in France and the United Kingdom, whereas in Belgium the extra-parliamentary party leadership and a detailed policy agreement have a strong impact on members' discipline.