The logic of habit in International Relations
The logic of habit in International Relations
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国际关系中的习惯逻辑
DOI：
10.1177/1354066110363502
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发表时间：
2010
影响因子：
3.4
通讯作者：
T. Hopf
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
T. Hopf
结果主义逻辑和得体性逻辑主导着国际关系理论。但马克斯·韦伯提出了四种选择逻辑，而不仅仅是两种。除了Zweckrationalität的工具理性和Wertrationalität的规范理性之外，还有情感和习惯。借鉴韦伯，詹姆斯，杜威和布迪厄，习惯的微观基础在神经认知心理学，我探索习惯的逻辑和它的后果，在IR理论的几个基本难题。习惯逻辑必然排除理性、能动性和不确定性，因此对国际政治中的合作、安全困境、持久对抗和安全共同体提供了不同的解释。习惯的逻辑也填补了主流建构主义的主体间性结构理论化的空白，使理所当然的生活世界重新成为关注的中心。
IR theory is dominated by the logics of consequentialism and appropriateness. But Max Weber offered four logics of choice, not just two. Beyond the instrumental rationality of Zweckrationalität and the normative rationality of Wertrationalität are affect and habit. Drawing on Weber, James, Dewey, and Bourdieu, and habit’s microfoundations in neurocognitive psychology, I explore the logic of habit and its consequences for several fundamental puzzles in IR theory. The logic of habit necessarily precludes rationality, agency, and uncertainty, and so offers a different interpretation of cooperation, security dilemmas, enduring rivalries, and security communities in international politics. The logic of habit also fills a gap in mainstream constructivism’s theorization of intersubjective structures, returning the taken-for-granted lifeworld to the center of attention.