Network externalities and endogenous timing in managerial firms
Network externalities and endogenous timing in managerial firms
复制标题
管理公司的网络外部性和内生时机
DOI：
10.1002/mde.3467
复制
发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
2.2
通讯作者：
Lee DongJoon
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Choi Kangsik;Lee DongJoon
本文研究了伯特兰竞争下存在网络外部性的内生时机选择问题。与均衡中的顺序性结果相反，我们证明了当管理者同时被委托进行市场和时机决策时，无论网络外部性如何，都存在一个独特的均衡同步移动。然而，当时间选择仍然掌握在所有者手中时，如果网络外部性弱（强），则涉及顺序（同时）均衡。因此，从社会福利和消费者剩余的角度来看，当网络外部性强度较强时，可以内生地获得帕累托优势。
We investigate the choice of endogenous timing in the presence of network externalities under Bertrand competition. Contrary to the results of sequentiality in equilibrium, we demonstrate that when managers are being delegated both the market and timing decision, there exists a unique simultaneous move in equilibrium regardless of network externalities. However, when the choice of timing remains in the owners' hands, if the network externalities are weak (strong), it involves sequential (simultaneous) equilibrium. Consequently, from the viewpoint of social welfare and consumer surplus, Pareto superiority can be obtained endogenously when the strength of network externalities is strong.