The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation, and Politics
复制标题
DOI：
10.1257/aer.99.4.1218
复制
发表时间：
2009-09-01
影响因子：
10.7
通讯作者：
Persson, Torsten
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Besley, Timothy;Persson, Torsten
经济学家通常认为，国家有足够的制度能力来支持市场和征税。本文建立了一个框架，在这个框架中，市场监管和税收方面的“政策选择”受到过去在法律的和财政能力方面的投资的约束。它研究了这种投资的经济和政治决定因素，表明法律的和财政能力通常是相辅相成的。结果表明，除其他外，共同利益的公共产品，如打击外部战争，以及政治稳定和包容性的政治机构，有利于建设国家能力。跨国数据中的一些相关性与理论一致。(JEL D72、E62、H11、H20、P14）
Economists generally assume that the state has sufficient institutional capacity to support markets and levy taxes. This paper develops a framework where "policy choices" in market regulation and taxation are constrained by past investments in legal and fiscal capacity. It studies the economic and political determinants of such investments, demonstrating that legal and fiscal capacity are typically complements. The results show that, among other things, common interest public goods, such as fighting external wars, as well as political stability and inclusive political institutions, are conducive to building state capacity. Some correlations in cross-country data are consistent with the theory. (JEL D72, E62, H11, H20, P14)