Replicator dynamics with Pigovian subsidy and capitation tax
Replicator dynamics with Pigovian subsidy and capitation tax
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DOI：
10.1016/j.na.2008.11.072
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发表时间：
2009-12-15
影响因子：
1.4
通讯作者：
Misaka, Takurou
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Kanazawa, Takafumi;Fukumoto, Yasuhiko;Misaka, Takurou
个人的自私行为会导致社会效率低下，个人效用总量不能最大化。为了解决这个问题，政府有时会试图通过向人口中的个人征税和/或提供补贴来控制人口。税收大致分为税率税和人头税。作者利用进化博弈论，提出了一个带有税率的微分方程模型，以分析其对参与者行为的影响。在本文中，我们提出了人头税的微分方程模型，并推导了目标状态的稳定性条件。此外，我们还讨论了我们的模型在自私路由游戏中的应用。 (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. 保留所有权利。
The selfish behaviors of individuals can cause an inefficient society in which the total amount of the individuals' utilities is not maximized. To resolve the problem, a government sometimes tries to control the population by imposing a tax on and/or offering a subsidy to the individuals who belong to the population. The tax is roughly classified into rate taxations and capitation taxes. Using an evolutionary game theory, the authors have proposed a differential equation model with rate taxations to analyze their effects on players' behaviors. In this paper, we propose a differential equation model with the capitation taxes, and derive stability conditions of the target state. Moreover, we also discuss an application of our model to selfish routing games. (C) 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.