Delivered Pricing, FOB Pricing, and Collusion in Spatial Markets
Delivered Pricing, FOB Pricing, and Collusion in Spatial Markets
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交货定价、离岸定价和空间市场中的串通
DOI：
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发表时间：
1992
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通讯作者：
M. P. Espinosa
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
M. P. Espinosa
本文考察了空间市场中的价格歧视和串通。这个问题是在重复的双寡头博弈的背景下分析的。我的结论是，现行的定价制度取决于市场的结构性因素。交付定价系统在高度垄断和高度竞争的行业中出现均衡，而离岸价格体系则用于中间市场结构。推动这一结果的事实是，交付定价政策允许空间价格歧视，为串通提供便利，但同时它们具有一个非常有竞争力的特征：它们是唯一可以在竞争激烈的市场结构中保持下去的定价规则。
This article examines price discrimination and collusion in spatial markets. The problem is analyzed in the context of a repeated duopoly game. I conclude that the prevailing pricing systems depend on the structural elements of the market. Delivered pricing systems emerge in equilibrium in highly monopolistic and highly competitive industries, while FOB is used in intermediate market structures. The fact driving this result is that delivered pricing policies allow spatial price discrimination that facilitates collusion, but at the same time they have a very competitive feature: they are the only pricing rules that could be sustained in a very competitive market structure.