MULTITASK PRINCIPAL AGENT ANALYSES - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND JOB DESIGN
MULTITASK PRINCIPAL AGENT ANALYSES - INCENTIVE CONTRACTS, ASSET OWNERSHIP, AND JOB DESIGN
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DOI：
10.1093/jleo/7.special_issue.24
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发表时间：
1991-01-01
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
MILGROM, P
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
HOLMSTROM, B;MILGROM, P
在委托代理问题的标准经济处理中，补偿制度具有分配风险和奖励生产性工作的双重功能。当代理人厌恶风险时，这两种功能之间就会出现紧张关系，因为为代理人提供有效的工作激励往往会迫使他承担不必要的风险。然而，分析这种紧张关系的现有正式模型只产生了有限的结果。”该理论的一个困惑是，雇佣合同经常规定固定工资，更普遍的是，公司内部的激励似乎如此微弱，特别是与市场相比。此外，这些模型仍然太棘手，无法有效解决更广泛的组织问题，例如资产所有权、工作设计和权力分配。在本文中，我们将分析委托代理模型 (i) 即使在有良好的、客观的产出衡量标准并且代理人对激励性薪酬高度敏感的情况下，也可以支付固定工资；(ii) 即使合同可以充分考虑所有可观察变量并且法院执行完美，也可以对所有权模式提出建议和预测；(iii) 可以解释为什么雇佣有时优于独立控制。
In the standard economic treatment of the principal-agent problem, compen-sation systems serve the dual function of allocating risks and rewarding pro-ductive work. A tension between these two functions arises when the agent is risk averse, for providing the agent with effective work incentives often forces him to bear unwanted risk. Existing formal models that have analyzed this tension, however, have produced only limited results." It remains a puzzle for this theory that employment contracts so often specify fixed wages and more generally that incentives within firms appear to be so muted, especially compared to those of the market. Also, the models have remained too intractable to effectively address broader organizational issues such as asset ownership, job design, and allocation of authority.In this article, we will analyze a principal-agent model that (i) can account for paying fixed wages even when good, objective output measures are available and agents are highly responsive to incentive pay;(ii) can make recommendations and predictions about ownership patterns even when contracts can take full account of all observable variables and court enforcement is perfect;(iii) can explain why employment is sometimes superior to independent con-