Representing Defense
Representing Defense
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代表防守
DOI：
10.1177/0022002703254477
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发表时间：
2003
影响因子：
3.1
通讯作者：
Richard Stoll
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Richard C. Eichenberg;Richard Stoll
现在有大量证据表明，美国的国防开支决策受到公民偏好的影响。然而，除了美国之外，几乎没有其他国家的时间序列证据。对五个民主国家国防开支政治中公民反应和意见代表的回归模型进行了估计。结果表明，所有五个国家的公众舆论都对最近的国防开支变化做出了系统的反应，而且各国的反应形式都一致类似于Wlezien提出的“恒温器”隐喻和Stimson提出的更一般的舆论动态理论。研究结果还表明，国防预算具有代表性：公众对国防支出的支持对四个国家的国防预算变化始终具有最显着的影响；因此，比较政策代表性的简约理论是可能实现的。讨论了结果对北约联盟和欧盟国防开支的影响。
There is nowsubstantial evidence that defense spending decisions in the United States are influenced by citizen preferences. However, there is little time-series evidence for countries other than the United States. Regression models of citizen responsiveness and opinion representation in the politics of defense spending in five democracies are estimated. Results showthat public opinion in all five countries is systematically responsive to recent changes in defense spending, and the form of the responses across countries uniformly resembles the “thermostat” metaphor developed by Wlezien and the more general theory of opinion dynamics developed by Stimson. Findings showalso that defense budgeting is representative: public support for defense spending is the most consistently significant influence on defense budgeting change in four countries; thus, a parsimonious theory of comparative policy representation is potentially within reach. The implications of the results for defense spending in the NATO alliance and the European Union are discussed.