On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
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DOI：
10.1016/j.imavis.2008.12.008
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发表时间：
2009-08
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Chengqing Li;Shujun Li;M. Asim;J. Nunez;G. Álvarez;Guanrong Chen
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Chengqing Li;Shujun Li;M. Asim;J. Nunez;G. Álvarez;Guanrong Chen
研究了最近提出的一种基于混沌的图像加密方案的安全性，指出该方案存在以下问题：（1）存在大量的无效密钥和弱密钥，且某些密钥对加/解密是部分等价的：（2）给定一个选择的平面图像，可以用比简单的暴力攻击更小的计算复杂度来猜测子密钥K10;（3）在至多128个选择明文图像的情况下，选择明文攻击有可能破解密钥的以下部分：[公式：见正文]，当K_（10）不太大时效果很好;（4）当K_（10）较小时，可以仅利用一个已知明文图像来执行已知明文攻击，以恢复由相同密钥加密的任何其它明文图像的某些可视信息。
This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K10can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; (3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: [Formula: see text] , which works very well when K10is not too large; (4) when K10is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key.