What To Expect From Sectoral Trading: A Us-China Example
What To Expect From Sectoral Trading: A Us-China Example
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DOI：
10.1142/s201000781100019x
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发表时间：
2011-02
影响因子：
2.3
通讯作者：
Claire Gavard;Niven Winchester;H. Jacoby;S. Paltsev
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Claire Gavard;Niven Winchester;H. Jacoby;S. Paltsev
在最近的《联合国气候变化框架公约》（《气候公约》）谈判中，有人提议进行部门贸易，以鼓励尽早采取行动，刺激发展中国家对低碳技术的投资。这一机制包括将一个或多个国家的一个部门纳入国际限额和交易制度。我们使用麻省理工学院排放预测和政策分析（EPPA）模型分析了中国电力部门和美国经济范围内的限额与交易计划之间的碳许可交易。到2030年，美国将从中国购买价值420亿美元的许可证，占其上限排放量的46%。在中国，部门交易提高了电价，减少了总发电量，特别是煤炭发电量。然而，部门贸易仅导致核能和可再生能源发电量的适度增长。我们还注意到其他部门的排放量增加。在美国，廉价的排放许可证降低了气候政策的成本，增加了发电量。
In the recent United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, sectoral trading was proposed to encourage early action and spur investment in low carbon technologies in developing countries. This mechanism involves including a sector from one or more nations in an international cap-and-trade system. We analyze trade in carbon permits between the Chinese electricity sector and a US economy-wide cap-and-trade program using the MIT Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model. In 2030, the US purchases permits valued at $42 billion from China, which represents 46% of its capped emissions. In China, sectoral trading increases the price of electricity and reduces aggregate electricity generation, especially from coal. However, sectoral trading induces only moderate increases in generation from nuclear and renewables. We also observe increases in emission from other sectors. In the US, the availability of cheap emissions permits reduces the cost of climate policy and increases electricity generation.