Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues With Utility-Maximizing Teams
Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues With Utility-Maximizing Teams
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DOI：
10.1177/1527002511404787
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发表时间：
2011-06-01
影响因子：
1.7
通讯作者：
Lang, Markus
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dietl, Helmut M.;Grossmann, Martin;Lang, Markus
本文建立了一个职业体育联盟的竞赛模型，在这个模型中，俱乐部的利润和胜利的加权总和（效用最大化）是最大化的。该模型分析了某些俱乐部以赢为导向的行为如何影响人才投资、竞争平衡和俱乐部利润。此外，与传统模型相比，作者表明，由于钝化效应，收入共享并不总是降低投资激励。作者发现了收入分享的一种新效应，称为“锐化效应”。“在锐化效应（钝化效应）存在的情况下，收入分成增强（减少）了投资激励，改善（恶化）了联赛的竞争平衡。
This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-oriented behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance, and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, the authors show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. The authors identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the ''sharpening effect.'' In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.