Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could.
Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could.
复制标题
理性非理性:即使人们可以纠正他们的推理错误,他们也不会纠正。
DOI:
10.1037/xge0001375.supp
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
D. Holford
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
M. Sirota;Marie Juanchich;D. Holford
Why is it that sometimes people do not correct their reasoning errors? The dominating dual-process theories of reasoning detail how people (fail to) detect their reasoning errors but underspecify how people decide to correct these errors once they are detected. We have unpacked the motivational aspects of the correction process here, leveraging the research on cognitive control. Specifically, we argue that when people detect an error, they decide whether or not to correct it based on the overall expected value associated with the correction-combining perceived efficacy and the reward associated with the correction while considering the cost of effort. Using a modified two-response paradigm, participants solved cognitive reflection problems twice while we manipulated the factors defining the expected value associated with correction at the second stage. In five experiments (N = 5,908), we found that answer feedback and reward increased the probability of correction while cost decreased it, relative to the control groups. These cognitive control critical factors affected the decisions to correct reasoning errors (Experiments 2 and 3) and the corrective reasoning itself (Experiments 1, 4 and 5) across a range of problems, feedbacks, types of errors (reflective or intuitive), and cost and reward manipulations pre-tested and checked in five separate studies (N = 951). Thus, some people did not correct their epistemically irrational reasoning errors because they followed the instrumentally rational principle of the expected value maximization: They were rationally irrational. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).