Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could.

Rationally irrational: When people do not correct their reasoning errors even if they could.
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理性非理性:即使人们可以纠正他们的推理错误,他们也不会纠正。

DOI:
10.1037/xge0001375.supp
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发表时间:
2023
期刊:
Journal of experimental psychology. General
影响因子:
--
通讯作者:
D. Holford
D. Holford
中科院分区:
--
文献类型:
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作者:
M. Sirota;Marie Juanchich;D. Holford

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为什么有时候人们不能纠正他们的推理错误?占主导地位的双过程推理理论详细说明了人们如何(未能)发现他们的推理错误,但没有详细说明一旦发现这些错误,人们如何决定纠正这些错误。我们在这里利用对认知控制的研究,揭示了纠正过程中的动机因素。具体来说,我们认为,当人们发现一个错误,他们决定是否要纠正它的基础上与纠正相结合的整体预期值感知效能和奖励与纠正,同时考虑努力的成本。使用修改后的两个响应范例,参与者解决了两次认知反射问题,而我们操纵的因素定义的预期值与纠正在第二阶段。在五个实验(N = 5,908)中,我们发现,相对于对照组,答案反馈和奖励增加了纠正的概率,而成本降低了纠正的概率。这些认知控制的关键因素影响的决定,以纠正推理错误(实验2和3)和纠正推理本身(实验1,4和5)在一系列的问题,反馈,类型的错误(反射或直观),成本和奖励操纵预测试和检查在五个独立的研究(N = 951)。因此,有些人没有纠正他们的认知非理性推理错误,因为他们遵循了期望价值最大化的工具理性原则:他们是理性非理性的。(PsycInfo数据库记录(c)2023阿帕,保留所有权利)。
Why is it that sometimes people do not correct their reasoning errors? The dominating dual-process theories of reasoning detail how people (fail to) detect their reasoning errors but underspecify how people decide to correct these errors once they are detected. We have unpacked the motivational aspects of the correction process here, leveraging the research on cognitive control. Specifically, we argue that when people detect an error, they decide whether or not to correct it based on the overall expected value associated with the correction-combining perceived efficacy and the reward associated with the correction while considering the cost of effort. Using a modified two-response paradigm, participants solved cognitive reflection problems twice while we manipulated the factors defining the expected value associated with correction at the second stage. In five experiments (N = 5,908), we found that answer feedback and reward increased the probability of correction while cost decreased it, relative to the control groups. These cognitive control critical factors affected the decisions to correct reasoning errors (Experiments 2 and 3) and the corrective reasoning itself (Experiments 1, 4 and 5) across a range of problems, feedbacks, types of errors (reflective or intuitive), and cost and reward manipulations pre-tested and checked in five separate studies (N = 951). Thus, some people did not correct their epistemically irrational reasoning errors because they followed the instrumentally rational principle of the expected value maximization: They were rationally irrational. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).