Why has China not embraced a global cap-and-trade regime?
Why has China not embraced a global cap-and-trade regime?
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DOI：
10.1080/14693062.2007.9685646
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发表时间：
2003-09
期刊：
影响因子：
7.1
通讯作者：
Zhongxiang Zhang
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Zhongxiang Zhang
尽管许多经济研究表明，中国将从参与全球总量管制与交易制度中获得巨大利益，但中国一直拒绝参与有关这一问题的国际谈判。理解中国的潜在担忧是解释中国为什么没有接受国际温室气体排放交易计划的关键。这是探讨包括中国在未来的谈判和计划的潜在基础。本文从以下几个方面来考虑这个问题，这些方面对中国有影响：（a）公平性：发展中国家如何看待排放上限？(b)为什么中国和印度对国际排放交易持怀疑态度？(c)与向美国出口排放许可相比，中国对清洁发展机制投资的流入会有什么政治看法？(d)特别是在没有为2012年后设定排放目标的规则和原则的情况下，“锁定”排放上限会产生什么影响？(e)为发展中国家设定未来排放上限的复杂问题。
Although many economic studies suggest that China would reap significant benefits from participating in a global cap-and-trade regime, China has consistently refused to participate in international negotiations on this issue. Understanding China's underlying concerns is a key to explaining why China has not embraced an international greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. This is explored as a potential basis for including China in future negotiations and schemes. This issue is considered from the following perspectives that impact upon China: (a) fairness: how do developing countries perceive emissions caps? (b) why have China and India been sceptical about international emissions trading? (c) what would China's political perceptions be of an inflow of CDM investment in comparison with the exports of emissions permits to the USA? (d) what are the implications of ‘lock in’ to an emissions cap, particularly when no rules and principles exist for setting emissions targets for post-2012? (e) the complex question of establishing future emissions caps for developing countries.