Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards
Shared renewable resources and gains from trade under technology standards
复制标题
根据技术标准共享可再生资源和贸易收益
DOI：
10.1111/rode.12651
复制
发表时间：
2020
影响因子：
1.6
通讯作者：
Ogawa Takeshi
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Takarada Yasuhiro;Dong Weijia;Ogawa Takeshi
我们利用两国、两种商品的国际贸易模型，研究了共享渔业资源等可再生资源的国家之间的贸易收益和资源管理战略互动的收益。有两种商品：一种是资源商品，即共享库存的收获，另一种是其他商品，可以被视为制成品。资源品的生产率取决于收获技术和库存水平。本文重点讨论技术标准（例如，对渔具、船只、区域和时间的限制），而不是其他资源管理方法，因为它们最常在渔业中实施。技术标准被建模为对收获技术的限制；也就是说，在严格的技术标准下，企业利用资源就像使用劣质的收获技术一样。我们表明，贸易开放可能会减少共享存量，导致资源良好的进口国的稳态效用下降，而资源良好的出口国的稳态效用增加。引人注目的是，当共享库存处于危险之中（对收成的高需求）时，通过我们在本文中所说的多边资源管理开放贸易后，稳态收成最大化，并且两国都从贸易中获益。
Using a two‐country, two‐good model of international trade, we examine gains from trade and strategic interaction in resource management among countries that share renewable resources such as fishery stocks. Two goods are a resource good, which is the harvest of the shared stock, and some other good that may be thought of as manufactures. The productivity of the resource good depends on harvesting technology and the stock level. This paper focuses on technology standards (e.g., restrictions on fishing gears, vessels, areas, and time) over other methods for resource management because they are most commonly implemented in fisheries. Technology standards are modeled as a restriction on the harvesting technology; that is, under strict technology standards, firms exploit resources as if they are using inferior harvesting technology. We show that an opening up of trade may reduce the shared stock and cause steady‐state utility to decrease in a resource‐good importing country and increase in a resource‐good exporting country. Strikingly, when the shared stock is in jeopardy (a high demand for the harvest), steady‐state harvest is maximized after an opening up of trade by what we call multilateral resource management in this paper and both countries gain from trade.