Distributed Estimation of Power System Oscillation Modes Under Attacks on GPS Clocks
Distributed Estimation of Power System Oscillation Modes Under Attacks on GPS Clocks
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DOI：
10.1109/tim.2018.2801018
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发表时间：
2018-03
影响因子：
5.6
通讯作者：
Yongqiang Wang;J. Hespanha
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yongqiang Wang;J. Hespanha
相量测量单元（pmu）在电力系统的广域监测和控制中发挥着越来越重要的作用。pmu可以同步实时测量电网中多个远程位置的电压、相位角和频率，因为它们能够与全球定位系统（GPS）时钟对齐。鉴于这种能力容易受到GPS欺骗攻击的影响，并且GPS欺骗攻击很容易发动，在本文中，我们提出了一种分布式实时广域振荡估计方法，该方法对pmu及其相关相量数据集中器的GPS欺骗具有鲁棒性。该方法采用了根据历史记录和跨分布式节点检查更新一致性的思想，并且可以容忍多达三分之一的受损节点。它可以以完全分散的架构和完全异步的方式实现。通过IEEE 68总线电力系统模型的数值仿真验证了该方法的有效性。
Phasor measurement units (PMUs) are playing an increasingly important role in wide-area monitoring and the control of power systems. PMUs allow synchronous real-time measurements of voltage, phase angle, and frequency from multiple remote locations in the grid, enabled by their ability to align to global positioning system (GPS) clocks. Given that this ability is vulnerable to GPS spoofing attacks, which have been confirmed easy to launch, in this paper, we propose a distributed real-time wide-area oscillation estimation approach that is robust to GPS spoofing on PMUs and their associated phasor data concentrators. The approach employs the idea of checking update consistency with histories and across distributed nodes and can tolerate up to one third of compromised nodes. It can be implemented in a completely decentralized architecture and in a completely asynchronous way. The effectiveness of the approach is confirmed by numerical simulations of the IEEE 68-bus power system models.