Accounting for enforcement costs in the spatial allocation of marine zones
Accounting for enforcement costs in the spatial allocation of marine zones
复制标题
海洋区域空间分配中执法成本的核算
DOI：
10.1111/cobi.12358
复制
发表时间：
2015
影响因子：
6.3
通讯作者：
D. Pannell
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
K. Davis;M. Kragt;S. Gelcich;S. Schilizzi;D. Pannell
在许多情况下，海洋鱼类种群的捕捞高于可持续水平，但可通过限制使用分区制度加以保护。这些系统的有效性通常取决于沿海渔业社区的支持。然而，高昂的管理成本，包括执法成本，可能会阻止渔民支持海洋管理。我们将执法成本纳入了一个空间优化模型，该模型确定了如何在实现渔民收入最大化的同时实现保护目标。我们的模型确定了研究区域在不同区域之间的最佳分配：禁止捕捞、渔业区域使用者权利(TURF)或开放获取。分析表明，执行禁渔区和草坪区会产生成本，但通过防止偷猎和过度捕捞导致物种丰富。我们分析了不同的执法方案如何影响渔民的收入。当实施区域用户权限时，Fisher的收入比没有实施时高出约50%。该模型优先将面积分配给强制草坪区而不是其他区，表明强制草坪区的经济收益(来自较高的物种丰富度)超过了成本。这些发现对执行成本的增加是强有力的，但对物种市场价格的变化很敏感。我们还发现，在研究区现有的分区制度下，收入比最优解决方案下的收入低13-30%。我们的结果强调了对海洋养护执法的收益和成本进行核算的重要性，特别是在渔民造成的情况下。
Marine fish stocks are in many cases extracted above sustainable levels, but they may be protected through restricted‐use zoning systems. The effectiveness of these systems typically depends on support from coastal fishing communities. High management costs including those of enforcement may, however, deter fishers from supporting marine management. We incorporated enforcement costs into a spatial optimization model that identified how conservation targets can be met while maximizing fishers’ revenue. Our model identified the optimal allocation of the study area among different zones: no‐take, territorial user rights for fisheries (TURFs), or open access. The analysis demonstrated that enforcing no‐take and TURF zones incurs a cost, but results in higher species abundance by preventing poaching and overfishing. We analyzed how different enforcement scenarios affected fishers’ revenue. Fisher revenue was approximately 50% higher when territorial user rights were enforced than when they were not. The model preferentially allocated area to the enforced‐TURF zone over other zones, demonstrating that the financial benefits of enforcement (derived from higher species abundance) exceeded the costs. These findings were robust to increases in enforcement costs but sensitive to changes in species’ market price. We also found that revenue under the existing zoning regime in the study area was 13–30% lower than under an optimal solution. Our results highlight the importance of accounting for both the benefits and costs of enforcement in marine conservation, particularly when incurred by fishers.