Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts
Wild Bids. Gambling for Resurrection in Procurement Contracts
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狂野的出价。
DOI：
10.1023/b:rege.0000028013.76488.44
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发表时间：
2002
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Esther Hauk
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Aleix Calveras;J. Ganuza;Esther Hauk
本文分析了采购过程中中标异常低的问题。有限责任导致财务状况不佳的公司在采购拍卖中比财务状况良好的公司更积极地出价。因此，获胜公司很可能是一家陷入财务困难且破产风险较高的公司。本文重点探讨担保债券的监管实践来应对这一问题。我们表明，担保金的使用减少了甚至有时消除了异常低价的投标问题。我们提供了最佳保证金的描述，并表明美国要求保证金覆盖合同价格 100% 以上的做法可能有些过分，这意味着对异常低价投标问题的过度保险。
This paper analyses the problem of abnormally low tenders in the procurement process. Limited liability causes firms in a bad financial situation to bid more aggressively than financially healthy firms in the procurement auction. Therefore, it is likely that the winning firm is a firm in financial difficulties with a high risk of bankruptcy. The paper focuses on the regulatory practice of surety bonds to face this problem. We show that the use of surety bonds reduces and sometimes eliminates the problem of abnormally low tenders. We provide a characterization of the optimal surety bond and show that the U.S. practice of requiring that surety bonds cover over 100% of the contract price can be excessive, implying overinsurance to the problem of abnormally low tenders.