Self-Fulfilling Signal of an Endogenous State in Network Congestion Games
Self-Fulfilling Signal of an Endogenous State in Network Congestion Games
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DOI：
10.1007/s11067-017-9351-4
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发表时间：
2017-05
影响因子：
2.4
通讯作者：
T. Iwase;Y. Tadokoro;D. Fukuda
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
T. Iwase;Y. Tadokoro;D. Fukuda
研究了在网络拥塞博弈中通过信号协调来改善因交通流信息不完全而恶化的社会福利的问题。传统的信号控制研究只关注拥挤的外生因素，忽视了拥挤的外部性，没有考虑交通流的振荡现象。为了解决这一差距，我们制定了一个问题，设计一个协调信号的内源性信息的交通流量，并引入aself-fulfillingcharacteristic的信号，保证结果流与信号本身一致，而不会引起不必要的振荡。在高斯信号分布的情况下示出了自实现信号的实例。此外，我们给出了简单的数值例子。结果揭示了自实现信号如何抑制振荡，同时通过提高网络效率提高社会福利。
We consider the problem of coordination via signaling in network congestion games to improve social welfare deteriorated by incomplete information about traffic flow. Traditional studies on signaling, which focus on exogenous factors of congestion and ignore congestion externalities, fail to discuss the oscillations of traffic flow. To address this gap, we formulate a problem of designing a coordination signal on endogenous information about traffic flow and introduce aself-fulfillingcharacteristic of a signal that guarantees an outcome flow consistent with the signal itself without causing the unwanted oscillation. An instance of the self-fulfilling signal is shown in the case of a Gaussian signal distribution. In addition, we show simple numerical examples. The results reveal how a self-fulfilling signal suppresses the oscillation and simultaneously improves social welfare through improved network efficiency.