Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information
Approximate Solutions for Attack Graph Games with Imperfect Information
复制标题
不完全信息攻击图博弈的近似解
DOI：
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发表时间：
2015
期刊：
影响因子：
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通讯作者：
Christopher Kiekintveld
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
K. Durkota;V. Lisý;B. Bosanský;Christopher Kiekintveld
我们研究了网络安全强化问题，在这个问题中，网络管理员决定使用什么安全措施来最好地提高网络的安全性。具体地说，我们专注于部署称为蜜罐的诱骗服务或主机。我们将该问题建模为具有不完全信息的一般和扩展形式的博弈，并以Stackelberg均衡的形式寻求解。防御者在特定的计算机网络中寻找最优的随机化蜜罐部署，而攻击者从由攻击图紧凑表示的可能攻击的库中选择最佳响应作为应急攻击策略。在这个游戏中，使用标准混合整数线性规划计算精确的Stackelberg均衡的可扩展性有限。我们提出了一套近似求解方法，并分析了计算时间和计算策略质量之间的权衡。
We study the problem of network security hardening, in which a network administrator decides what security measures to use to best improve the security of the network. Specifically, we focus on deploying decoy services or hosts called honeypots. We model the problem as a general-sum extensive-form game with imperfect information and seek a solution in the form of Stackelberg Equilibrium. The defender seeks the optimal randomized honeypot deployment in a specific computer network, while the attacker chooses the best response as a contingency attack policy from a library of possible attacks compactly represented by attack graphs. Computing an exact Stackelberg Equilibrium using standard mixed-integer linear programming has a limited scalability in this game. We propose a set of approximate solution methods and analyze the trade-off between the computation time and the quality of the strategies calculated.