Understanding social preferences with simple tests
Understanding social preferences with simple tests
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DOI：
10.1162/003355302760193904
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发表时间：
2002-08-01
影响因子：
13.7
通讯作者：
Rabin, M
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Charness, G;Rabin, M
最近，经济实验中对自身利益的偏离激发了“社会偏好”模型的灵感。“我们设计了一系列简单的实验游戏，比现有的实验更直接地测试这些理论。我们的实验表明，受试者更关心增加社会福利牺牲以增加所有接受者的收益，特别是低收益的顺从者，而不是减少收益的差异（如最近的模型所假设的那样）。受试者也受到互惠的激励：当其他人不愿意牺牲时，他们撤回为实现公平结果而牺牲的意愿，有时会惩罚不公平的行为。
Departures from self-interest in economic experiments have recently inspired models of "social preferences." We design a range of simple experimental games that test these theories more directly than existing experiments. Our experiments show that subjects are more concerned with increasing social welfare-sacrificing to increase the payoffs for all recipients, especially low-payoff recipients-than with reducing differences in payoffs (as supposed in recent models). Subjects are also motivated by reciprocity: they withdraw willingness to sacrifice to achieve a fair outcome when others are themselves unwilling to sacrifice, and sometimes punish unfair behavior.