Conceptual room for ontic vagueness
Conceptual room for ontic vagueness
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本体模糊性的概念空间
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发表时间：
2007
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通讯作者：
Elizabeth Barnes
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作者：
Elizabeth Barnes
以某种精确的方式表示该对象的对象(可能的世界)。因此，根据游戏中确定性的定义，(2)根本就不是良构的。问一个可能的世界是否是确定的，就是问它的精确化集合中是否只有一个成员。但没有任何东西是一个可能世界的精确化的集合(可能的世界不是那种需要精确化的东西)，所以这个集合是否只有一个成员的问题是错误的预设。因此，(2)基本上是无稽之谈。我们可以将(2)替换为：(2)*在每一次精确化时，事物都是精确的，这似乎捕捉到了原始公式(2)背后的大部分直觉。但是(2)*只有在我们可以补充的情况下才会产生担忧：(3)*存在不止一个精确化当且仅当存在不精确度，但(3)*，如前所述，根据所提出的图景，仅仅是错误的。当且仅当存在不确定性时，才有多重精确化，但至关重要的是，不确定性并不意味着不精确度。一切都是精确的，这是完全确定的，但(让我们假设)事物是哪种精确的方式是不确定的。因为精确化不是那种本身就可以承认精确化的东西，它们也不是那种可以确定或不确定的东西。因此，‘实际世界是(在)确定的’形式的句子不能明智地放在确定性或情态运算符的范围内。这意味着像‘决定性的，有确定性’或‘必然的，那里’这样的句子
objects (possible worlds) which represent that object as being certain precise ways. Thus, given the definition of determinacy in play, (2) is simply not wellformed. To ask whether a possible world is determinate is to ask whether there is only one member in the set of its precisifications. But there is nothing that is the set of a possible world’s precisifications (possible worlds are not the sort of things to be precisified), so the question of whether that set has only one member has a false presupposition. Thus (2) is basically nonsensical. We can replace (2) with: (2)* At every precisification things are precise which seems to capture much of the intuitions behind the original formulation of (2). But (2)* will only generate a worry if we could add: (3)* There is more than one precisification iff there is imprecision But (3)*, as noted previously, is simply false according to the picture being put forward. There are multiple precisifications if and only if there is indeterminacy, but, crucially, indeterminacy does not entail imprecision. It’s perfectly determinate that everything is precise, but (let’s assume) it’s indeterminate which precise way things are. Since precisifications aren’t the kind of things which can themselves admit of precisification, they are not the kind of things which can be determinate or indeterminate. Thus sentences of the form ‘the actual world is (in)determinate’ cannot sensibly be put inside the scope of a determinacy or modal operator. This means that sentences like ‘determinately, there is determinacy’ or ‘necessarily, there