Better Never Than Late
Better Never Than Late
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DOI：
10.1126/science.310.5746.195
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发表时间：
2005-10
期刊：
影响因子：
56.9
通讯作者：
D. Kennedy
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
D. Kennedy
主编L上周，这个空间包含了一篇社论的菲利普夏普，处理困难的问题所提出的出版信息的某些"双重用途"的技术。这个词的出现是因为涉及改良的人类病原体的论文也是"选择剂"，可能会产生巨大的公共卫生利益，但也可能被恐怖分子用来对付同一个公众。由杰拉尔德·芬克（Gerald Fink）担任主席的美国国家科学院委员会在2003年的一份报告中建议成立国家生物安全科学咨询委员会（NSABB）。正如夏普的社论所报道的那样，《科学》杂志发表了Tumpey等人关于重建1918年西班牙流感病毒的论文，并就此咨询了该机构。它一致投票赞成出版。这听起来像是一个快乐的结局，但它并不完全快乐，也不是整个故事。该文件的历史包含了一些关于如何管理这种双重用途问题的教训。我们认识到这项工作可能会引起关于出版适当性的问题，我们在科学同行评审过程中考虑了这一点。我们按照既定程序，向了解安全问题的专家征求意见。位于美国疾病控制和预防中心（CDC）的作者被敦促与CDC主任Julie Gerberding和美国国家过敏和传染病研究所主任Anthony Fauci进行磋商。国家卫生研究院生物技术活动办公室（负责国家生物安保科学顾问委员会事务的办公室）主任艾米·帕特森也被告知。三人都认为，这项研究对公共卫生的好处远远超过了任何生物安全风险。! [图][1]贷方：科学在9月16日之前收到这些保证，因此对向前迈进充满信心，我们准备在9月26日的那一周早些时候将页面发送给打印机。那天，编辑部的工作人员去参加《科学》杂志在西弗吉尼亚州举行的年度务虚会。唉，9月27日晚，美国卫生与公众服务部（HHS）部长办公室打来电话，表示对这篇论文迟来的担忧。随后举行了一系列电话会议，涉及各种HHS官员，包括帕特森和助理HHS秘书斯图尔特西蒙森，谁报告说，HHS秘书迈克尔莱维特坚持由NSABB审查。我告诉他们，在24小时内，该问题将在打印机，并提醒他们，国家生物安全顾问委员会自己的章程明确规定，它不筛选个别文件。Simonson命令NSABB委员会进行投票-就在这个问题被打印出来的时候-一天后，我们得知它的批准。国家生物安保科学顾问委员会的一名病毒学家建议增加一篇社论，讨论一些生物安保问题。我们给了他们这一页：菲利普夏普被说服写一篇文章在短时间内，并产生了辉煌。他和我在星期天晚上做了一些最后的编辑，以便在最后一刻把它挤进这期杂志。从这一切中可以学到什么？开始，《科学》在咨询我们和HHS的有关当局时做了正确的事情。据我们了解，秘书办公室在最后一刻的干预是为了让国家生物安保科学顾问委员会对一个"活生生的"问题有一个真实的经验。这可能是一个有用的目的，但它确实给编辑和作者带来了一些困难。在这种情况下，还有其他一些问题应该引起科学界的关注。首先，这里有一个真实的权威问题。政府官员可以提出建议，而且应该认真听取。但他们不能仅仅因为认为研究结果“敏感”而下令不发表论文。正如里根时代的行政命令《国家安全决定指令189》所明确指出的那样，除了分类之外，不存在这样的类别。如果一篇论文因为生物安全风险而不应该发表，那么它应该被分类。第二，国家生物安保科学顾问委员会应将这第一项工作视为有益的一次性工作，转而履行其制定原则的任务，而不是就个别文件作出决定。那么，考虑到我们自己的信念、时机以及我们从与Gerberding、Fauci和其他人的磋商中了解到的情况，即使NSABB投了反对票，我会发表这篇论文吗？当然，除非他们把它列为机密。[1]：待定：是
Editor-in-Chief L ast week, this space contained an editorial by Phillip Sharp, dealing with the difficult problems raised by the publication of information about certain “dual-use” technologies. The term arises because papers dealing with modified human pathogens that are also “select agents” might yield great public health benefits but also could be used by terrorists against that same public. A U.S. National Academies committee chaired by Gerald Fink recommended in a 2003 report that a National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) be established. As Sharp's editorial reported, that body was consulted with regard to Science 's publication of the paper by Tumpey et al. on the reconstruction of the 1918 Spanish influenza virus. It voted unanimously in favor of publication. That may sound like a happy ending, but it wasn't entirely happy nor is it the whole story. The paper's history contains some lessons about how this kind of dual-use problem should be managed. We recognized that the work might raise questions about the propriety of publication, and we considered this during the process of scientific peer review. We followed an established procedure in which we solicit views from experts who have knowledge about security issues. The authors located at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) were urged to consult with CDC Director Julie Gerberding and with Anthony Fauci, director of the U.S. National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Disease. Amy Patterson, director of the Office of Biotechnology Activities (the office responsible for NSABB matters) at the National Institutes of Health, was also informed. All three felt that the public health benefits of the study far outweighed any biosecurity risks. ![Figure][1] CREDIT: SCIENCE Having received these assurances by 16 September and thus confident about moving forward, we were prepared to send pages to the printer early in the week of 26 September. On that day, the editorial staff went off to Science 's annual retreat in West Virginia. Alas, on the evening of 27 September, a call was relayed from the Office of the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), indicating belated concerns about the paper. There followed a series of conference calls involving various HHS officials, including Patterson and Assistant HHS Secretary Stewart Simonson, who reported that HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt was insisting on review by the NSABB. I told them that in 24 hours the issue would be at the printer, and reminded them that the NSABB's own charter makes it clear that it does not screen individual papers. Simonson ordered that the NSABB committee be polled—just as the issue was being printed—and a day later, we learned of its approval. A virologist on the NSABB board suggested adding an editorial addressing some of the biosecurity issues. We gave them this page: Phillip Sharp was persuaded to write a piece on short notice, and produced splendidly. He and I did some final edits on Sunday night so that it could be squeezed into the issue at the last possible moment. What can be learned from all this? To begin with, Science did the right thing in consulting with the proper authorities, both our own and those at HHS. The 11th-hour intervention from the secretary's office, it has been explained to us, was to give the NSABB a real experience with a “live” issue. That may have been a useful purpose, but it did cause some hardship to editors and authors alike. There are other issues in such cases that should concern the scientific community. First, there is a real question of authority here. Government officials can advise, and should be listened to thoughtfully. But they can't order the nonpublication of a paper just because they consider the findings “sensitive.” No such category short of classification exists, as the Reagan-era Executive Order National Security Decision Directive 189, still in force, makes clear. If a paper should not be published because of biosecurity risks, then it should be classified. Second, the NSABB should regard this first exercise as a helpful one-off and turn to its mandate of developing principles rather than making decisions on individual papers. So would I, given our own convictions, the timing, and what we had learned from our consultations with Gerberding, Fauci, and others, have published the paper even if the NSABB had voted otherwise? Absolutely—unless they had it classified. [1]: pending:yes