The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
The Optimum Enforcement of Laws
复制标题
DOI：
10.1086/259646
复制
发表时间：
1970-05
影响因子：
8.2
通讯作者：
G. Stigler
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
G. Stigler
所有对个人行为的规定都需要强制执行。通常，以规定方式行事的义务是通过明示或默示的合同自愿达成的。例如，我承诺以指定的频率教授某些课程，并讨论我和其他人认为与课程名称相关的问题。通过协商，如果协商失败，通过法律的行动，我和我的雇主寻求强制执行雇佣合同，防止严重偏离承诺的行为。某些行为的表现是很难或不可能实现的，比如承诺要有创造性、高尚或在危机中坚定不移，因此，只有当存在毫无争议的公然违反时，这种合同承诺才会不被做出或执行。经济学家们几乎没有研究过执行各种契约的成本对契约以及一般经济组织的影响，尽管这种影响具有巨大的潜在解释力。当规定的行为是单方面而不是通过个人协议确定的，我们就有了法规或法律，而这些单方面规则的执行就是本文的主题。从规定的行为中分离出来的实际行为是犯罪或违法行为，尽管人们可能希望用一个比“犯罪”更不可怕的描述来描述许多微不足道的违法行为或违反不公正法律的违法行为。我的主要目的是构建一个理性执行的理论，这个理论在很大程度上要归功于加里·贝克尔（Gary Becker）关于这个主题的主要文章（1968）。在结论中，解释的问题，区别于时效，将被评论。
All prescriptions of behavior for individuals require enforcement. Usually the obligation to behave in a prescribed way is entered into voluntarily by explicit or implicit contract. For example, I promise to teach certain classes with designated frequency and to discuss matters which I, and possibly others, believe are relevant to the course titles. By negotiation, and in the event of its failure, by legal action, I and my employer seek to enforce the contract of employment against large departures from the promised behavior. Performance of some kinds of behavior is difficult or impossible to enforce-such as promises to be creative, noble, or steadfast in crisis-and as a result such contractual promises are either not made or enforced only when there is an uncontroversially flagrant violation. The influence upon contract, and upon economic organization generally, of the costs of enforcing various kinds of contracts has received virtually no study by economists, despite its immense potential explanatory power. When the prescribed behavior is fixed unilaterally rather than by individual agreement, we have the regulation or law, and enforcement of these unilateral rules is the subject of the present essay. Departures of actual from prescribed behavior are crimes or violations, although one could wish for a less formidable description than "criminal" to describe many of the trifling offenses or the offenses against unjust laws. My primary purpose is to construct a theory of rational enforcement, a theory which owes much to Gary Becker's major article on the subject (1968). In the conclusion the problem of explanation, as distinguished from prescription, will be commented upon.