Competition in Financial Innovation
Competition in Financial Innovation
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DOI：
10.3982/ecta9837
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发表时间：
2012-09
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
A. Carvajal;M. Rostek;Marek Weretka
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Carvajal;M. Rostek;Marek Weretka
本文研究了无摩擦竞争市场（卖空）对企业家创新证券的激励。在投资者效用对称的经济体中，我们提供了一种条件，在这种条件下，一个完整的金融结构使一个市场的市场价值最大化--也就是说，当引起市场不完全性的机制是艾伦和盖尔（1991）的经典例子中所说明的机制时。在这种情况下，不完整性的基础来自创新成本和企业家之间的搭便车。对于不完全金融结构最大化企业市场价值的偏好类，市场是不完全的，概率为1，即使创新是无成本的。从这个意义上说，我们为艾伦和盖尔的市场不完整性基础提供了一种替代方案。
This paper examines the incentives to innovate securities provided by frictionless competitive markets (with short sales) to entrepreneurs. In economies with symmetric investor utilities, we provide the conditions under which a …rm’s market value is maximized by a complete …nancial structure –that is, when the mechanism that gives rise to market incompleteness is the one illustrated in the classical example of Allen and Gale (1991). The foundation for incompleteness in that case is derived from innovation costs and free riding among entrepreneurs. For the class of preferences where an incomplete …nancial structure maximizes the …rms’market values, markets are incomplete with a probability of one, even when innovation is cost free. In this sense, we provide an alternative to Allen and Gale’s foundation for market incompleteness.