What is embodied about cognition?
What is embodied about cognition?
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DOI：
10.1080/23273798.2014.987791
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发表时间：
2015-05-01
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Mahon BZ
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Mahon BZ
目前，关于单词和物体的含义是否全部或部分以特定于模态的格式（即具身认知假设）来表示存在争议。我认为，关于具身/非具身认知的争论要么在很大程度上得到解决，有利于概念以非模态形式表示的观点，要么在具身和非具身方法不再是连贯不同的理论的时候。这值得重新考虑现有证据可以告诉我们有关概念系统结构的信息。我们知道概念系统在线参与感官和运动内容。这就提出了一个新问题：人类概念系统如何能够脱离感觉运动系统？回答这个问题将说明人类思维如何能够脱离当下，并从有限的经验推断出世界可能是什么样子的假设状态。正是思想相对于感知和行动的独立性使得人类认知变得特殊，而这种独立性是通过概念和感觉运动表征之间的表征区别来保证的。
It is currently debated whether the meanings of words and objects are represented, in whole or in part, in a modality-specific format—the embodied cognition hypothesis. I argue that the embodied/disembodied cognition debate is either largely resolved in favor of the view that concepts are represented in an amodal format, or at a point where the embodied and disembodied approaches are no longer coherently distinct theories. This merits reconsideration of what the available evidence can tell us about the structure of the conceptual system. We know that the conceptual system engages, online, with sensory and motor content. This frames a new question: How is it that the human conceptual system is able to disengage from the sensorimotor system? Answering this question would say something about how the human mind is able to detach from the present and extrapolate from finite experience to hypothetical states of how the world could be. It is the independence of thought from perception and action that makes human cognition special—and that independence is guaranteed by the representational distinction between concepts and sensorimotor representations.
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