Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge
Two Kinds of Self‐Knowledge
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两种自我认识
DOI：
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发表时间：
2009
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影响因子：
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通讯作者：
M. Boyle
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作者：
M. Boyle
我认为，各种有影响力的自我认识的帐户是错误的假设，所有直接的，权威的知识，我们自己目前的心理状态是一个基本的种类。相反，我主张，对自我认识的一个令人满意的解释必须承认至少两种根本上不同的自我认识：一种是主动的自我认识，通过这种自我认识，我们知道自己的判断;另一种是被动的自我认识，通过这种自我认识，我们知道自己的感觉。我指出，前一种自我认识在一个重要的意义上是基本的，因为它与理性反思的能力密切相关，因为它必须存在于任何理解第一人称代词的生物中。此外，我认为这些关于自我认识的思想有一个康德的渊源。
I argue that a variety of influential accounts of self-knowledge are flawed by the assumption that all immediate, authoritative knowledge of our own present mental states is of one basic kind. I claim, on the contrary, that a satisfactory account of self-knowledge must recognize at least two fundamentally different kinds of self-knowledge: an active kind through which we know our own judgments, and a passive kind through which we know our sensations. I show that the former kind of self-knowledge is in an important sense fundamental, since it is intimately connected with the very capacity for rational reflection, and since it must be present in any creature that understands the first-person pronoun. Moreover, I suggest that these thoughts about self-knowledge have a Kantian provenance.