Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception
Can Emotion be Modelled on Perception
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情感可以根据感知建模吗
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发表时间：
2011
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通讯作者：
M. Salmela
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作者：
M. Salmela
情感知觉理论旨在通过将情感建模于知觉来避免传统认知主义和非认知主义的问题，知觉共享最明显的情感、意向性和现象性维度。在本文中，我将重新解释和讨论感知理论家提出的四个关键论点，以表明情感是一种感知，或者情感与感知之间存在密切的相似性。这些论证从强到弱依次为：感知系统论证；来自非推理结构的论证；来自认知角色的论证；以及现象学的论证。我认为，虽然支持将情感同化为知觉的论点失败了，但情感和知觉之间的类比并不像知觉理论家所认为的那么接近，即使某些情感比其他情感更类似于知觉，这要归功于情感处理的两级结构。
Perceptual theories of emotion purport to avoid the problems of traditional cognitivism and noncognitivism by modelling emotion on perception, which shares the most conspicuous dimensions of emotion, intentionality and phenomenality. In this paper, I shall reconstrue and discuss four key arguments that perceptual theorists have presented in order to show that emotion is a kind of perception, or that there are close analogies between emotion and perception. These arguments are, from stronger to weaker claims: the perceptual system argument; the argument from noninferential structure; the argument from epistemic role; and the argument from phenomenology. I argue that, while the arguments in favour of assimilating emotion to perception fail, the analogies between emotion and perception are not as close as perceptual theorists suggest even if some emotions resemble perception more than others, thanks to the two-levelled structure of emotional processing.