Propaganda in the digital age
Propaganda in the digital age
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数字时代的宣传
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发表时间：
2017
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通讯作者：
Corneliu Bjola
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作者：
Corneliu Bjola
媒体披露，俄罗斯政府涉嫌利用社交媒体网络影响2016年美国总统选举，或者更广泛地说，扰乱欧洲的选举进程，这明显将公众和学术话语转向了讨论和调查数字外交的“阴暗面”。“阿拉伯之春”早期关于数字平台赋予无权者权力的乐观情绪，已经让位于仇恨回声室的扩散和后真相政治的兴起所引发的悲观情绪。因此，重要的是要评估这些发展，并问自己，我们对数字宣传究竟了解多少，我们不知道什么，我们应该知道什么，以便我们能够遏制（如果不能防止的话）其破坏性影响？我们知道什么？首先，我们现在肯定知道的是，随着社交媒体的兴起，国家支持的宣传已经爆发，数量惊人。例如，根据Facebook、b谷歌和Twitter代表在国会的证词，在2016年总统大选之前，可能有超过1.5亿人接触到了俄罗斯的虚假信息运动。相比之下，2016年只有2070万人观看了ABC、CBS、NBC和Fox电视台的晚间新闻广播（Lang, 2017）。我们也知道，对宣传的经典理解是“通过操纵重要符号来管理集体态度”（laswell, 1927, p. 627）仍然成立。改变的是这种操纵发生的方式，因为数字媒体有其自身的内在特征。内容的算法传播以及对传统媒体过滤器和意见形成看门人的规避，使虚假信息传播得更快、更深入、更情绪化，最重要的是，由于在线回音室支持和强化的确认偏见，虚假信息传播得更有弹性。最后，我们不仅知道数字宣传是什么和如何成为这样的现象，还知道为什么数字宣传会成为这样的现象。从更广泛的地缘政治角度来看，正如“格拉西莫夫主义”所指出的那样，数字宣传是实现政治和战略目标的有效非军事手段，其方式超过了武器的力量（引用于MacFarquhar， 2016）。换句话说，通过数字宣传将信息武器化已被一些国家视为纠正其全球地位中的权力不对称的最佳工具。我们不知道什么？有趣的是，尽管涉及数字虚假信息的渠道、僵尸网络和内容呈爆炸式增长，但我们不确定的是，数字宣传是否真的成功了。当然，仇恨回声室的推广和政治两极分化的在线升级是数字宣传的有形影响，不容忽视。更难以评估的是这些数字效应对接触它们的人的观点和行为产生的影响的性质。例如，研究表明，在美国总统大选期间，垃圾新闻在某些州的社交媒体上的表现“优于”真实新闻，专业新闻内容的分享比例在前一天达到最低点
Media revelations about the alleged use of social media networks by the Russian government for influencing the presidential elections in the United States in 2016 or, more broadly, for disrupting electoral processes in Europe have noticeably shifted the public and academic discourse towards discussing and investigating the “dark side” of the digital diplomacy. The optimism from the early days of the “Arab Spring” about digital platforms empowering the powerless, has given way to the pessimism induced by the proliferation of the echo-chambers of hate and the rise of post-truth politics. It is therefore important to take stock of these developments and ask ourselves what exactly we know about digital propaganda, what we do not know, and what should we know so that we can contain, if not prevent, its disruptive effects? What we know? To begin with, what we positively know by now is that state-sponsored propaganda has exploded with the rise of social media and the numbers are staggering. For example, according to the congressional testimony of Facebook, Google and Twitter representatives, more than 150 million people were likely exposed to the Russian disinformation campaign prior to the 2016 presidential election. To put it into context, only 20.7 million people watched the evening news broadcasts of ABC, CBS, NBC and Fox stations in 2016 (Lang, 2017). We also know that the classical understanding of propaganda as the “management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (Lasswell, 1927, p. 627) still stands. What has changed is the way this manipulation takes place as the digital medium comes with its own intrinsic features. Algorithmic dissemination of content and the circumvention of traditional media filters and opinion-formation gatekeepers, make disinformation spread faster, reach deeper, be more emotionally charged, and most importantly, be more resilient due to the confirmation bias that online echo-chambers enable and reinforce. Finally, we know not only what and how, but also why digital propaganda has become such a phenomenon. From a broader geopolitical perspective, digital propaganda, as the “Gerasimov Doctrine” points out, is an effective non-military means for achieving political and strategic goals, in a way that exceeds the power of force of weapons (cited in MacFarquhar, 2016). In other words, the weaponization of information via digital propaganda has come to be seen by some states as the optimal instrument for correcting power asymmetries in their global standing. What we don’t know? Intriguingly, despite the explosion of channels, botnets and content involved in digital disinformation, what we do not firmly know, is whether digital propaganda is actually successful. Certainly, the promotion of echo-chambers of hate and the online escalation of political polarization are tangible effects of digital propaganda, which cannot be ignored. What is more difficult to assess is the nature of the impact these digital effects has on the opinion and behaviour of the people exposed to them. For example, studies have shown that junk news “outperformed” real news on social media in certain states during the United States presidential elections, and the proportion of professional news content being shared hit its lowest point the day before