BUDGET SPILLOVERS AND FISCAL-POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE - EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
BUDGET SPILLOVERS AND FISCAL-POLICY INTERDEPENDENCE - EVIDENCE FROM THE STATES
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DOI:
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90036-s
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发表时间:
1993-10-01
影响因子:
9.8
通讯作者:
HINES, JR
中科院分区:
文献类型:
--
作者:
CASE, AC;ROSEN, HS;HINES, JR
This paper formalizes and tests the notion that states' expenditures depend on the spending of similarly situated states. We find that even after allowing for fixed state effects, year effects, and common random shocks among neighbors, a state government's level of per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by the expenditure levels of its neighbors. Ceteris paribus, a one dollar increase in a state's neighbors' expenditures increases its own expenditure by over 70 cents.