Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors
Posted Pricing and Prophet Inequalities with Inaccurate Priors
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发布的定价和预言不平等与不准确的先验
DOI：
10.1145/3328526.3329576
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发表时间：
2019
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Thomas Kesselheim
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Paul Dütting;Thomas Kesselheim
在发布定价中，一个人定义了商品（或其他结果）的价格，买家以某种顺序到达，并在剩余的商品中选择他们最喜欢的捆绑。在过去的几年里，我们对这种机制的理解有了很大的提高。标准假设是，该机制对买家估值的概率分布有确切的了解。然后根据这些信息来确定价格。我们检查现有的结果和技术在多大程度上对不准确的先验信念是稳健的。也就是说，价格是根据相似但不同的概率分布来选择的。我们集中讨论福利最大化的问题。我们考虑概率分布上的所有标准距离度量，并推导出在各种度量中可以为所有标准技术导出的福利保证的严格界限。
In posted pricing, one defines prices for items (or other outcomes), buyers arrive in some order and take their most preferred bundle among the remaining items. Over the last years, our understanding of such mechanisms has improved considerably. The standard assumption is that the mechanism has exact knowledge of probability distribution the buyers' valuations are drawn from. The prices are then set based on this knowledge. We examine to what extent existing results and techniques are robust to inaccurate prior beliefs. That is, the prices are chosen with respect to similar but different probability distributions. We focus on the question of welfare maximization. We consider all standard distance measures on probability distributions, and derive tight bounds on the welfare guarantees that can be derived for all standard techniques in the various metrics.