SCNIFFER: Low-Cost, Automated, Efficient Electromagnetic Side-Channel Sniffing
SCNIFFER: Low-Cost, Automated, Efficient Electromagnetic Side-Channel Sniffing
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DOI：
10.1109/access.2020.3025022
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发表时间：
2020-01-01
期刊：
影响因子：
3.9
通讯作者：
Sen, Shreyas
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Danial, Josef;Das, Debayan;Sen, Shreyas
电磁(EM)侧通道分析(SCA)是破解数学安全加密引擎的重要工具，尤其是在资源受限的设备上。目前，要在嵌入式设备上执行EM SCA，需要手动扫描整个芯片，并在芯片上的每个点执行MTD(Minimum Traces To Disrupt)分析，以揭示加密算法的秘密密钥。然而，缺少用于电磁泄漏定位、痕迹获取和攻击的自动化端到端框架。这项工作提出了SCNIFFER：一个低成本、自动化的EM侧通道泄漏嗅探平台，用于执行高效的端到端侧通道攻击。使用测试矢量泄漏评估(TVLA)或信噪比(SNR)等泄漏度量，我们提出了一种贪婪的梯度搜索启发式算法，在O(N)次迭代内收敛到芯片上电磁泄漏最高的点之一(维度：N×N)，然后在该点执行相关EM分析(CEMA)。与详尽的MTD分析相比，这可将CEMA攻击时间缩短约N倍；与随机选择攻击位置相比，可将CEMA攻击时间缩短20倍。我们使用低成本定制的3-D扫描仪和H场探头(5万美元；000台商用EM扫描仪和各种微控制器作为攻击设备)演示了SCNIFFER。SCNIFFER框架针对在8位Atmega微控制器和32位ARM微控制器上运行的几种加密算法(AES-128、DES、RSA)进行了评估，以找到高泄漏点，然后在该点执行CEMA。
Electromagnetic (EM) side-channel analysis (SCA) is a prominent tool to break mathematically-secure cryptographic engines, especially on resource-constrained devices. Presently, to perform EM SCA on an embedded device, the entire chip is manually scanned and the MTD (Minimum Traces to Disclosure) analysis is performed at each point on the chip to reveal the secret key of the encryption algorithm. However, an automated end-to-end framework for EM leakage localization, trace acquisition, and attack has been missing. This work proposes SCNIFFER: a low-cost, automated EM Side Channel leakage SNIFFing platform to perform efficient end-to-end Side-Channel attacks. Using a leakage measure such as Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), or the signal to noise ratio (SNR), we propose a greedy gradient-search heuristic that converges to one of the points of highest EM leakage on the chip (dimension: N x N) within O(N) iterations, and then perform Correlational EM Analysis (CEMA) at that point. This reduces the CEMA attack time by similar to N times compared to an exhaustive MTD analysis, and by >20 x compared to choosing an attack location at random. We demonstrate SCNIFFER using a low-cost custombuilt 3-D scanner with an H-field probe ($50; 000 commercial EM scanners, and a variety of microcontrollers as the devices under attack. The SCNIFFER framework is evaluated for several cryptographic algorithms (AES-128, DES, RSA) running on both an 8-bit Atmega microcontroller and a 32-bit ARM microcontroller to find a point of high leakage and then perform a CEMA at that point.