Patent Licensing and Entry Deterrence: The Role of Low Royalties
Patent Licensing and Entry Deterrence: The Role of Low Royalties
复制标题
专利许可和进入威慑：低特许权使用费的作用
DOI：
10.2139/ssrn.1952764
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发表时间：
2014
期刊：
影响因子：
--
通讯作者：
Konstantinos Serfes
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
A. Duchêne;D. Sen;Konstantinos Serfes
type="main" xml:id="ecca12141-abs-0001"> We study how an incumbent patent holder can use licensing strategically to reduce the threat of further entry, through a low royalty. This licensing strategy deters entry by making the terms of future licensing agreements less favourable to potential entrants. Strategic licensing induces a trade-off between a more concentrated market and a lower price. When this strategy is profitable for the patent holder, it is welfare enhancing if and only if the entry cost is high, or the efficiency edge of the technology is significant. Our analysis yields new policy implications (e.g. royalty floor) with respect to strategic licensing.
