Locke and Berkeley on Abstract Ideas: From the Point of View of the Theory of Reference
Locke and Berkeley on Abstract Ideas: From the Point of View of the Theory of Reference
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洛克和伯克利论抽象观念：从指称理论的角度来看
DOI：
10.1007/s11406-022-00506-y
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发表时间：
2022
期刊：
影响因子：
0.5
通讯作者：
Yasuhiko Tomida
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
篠原成彦;篠原成彦;Tomida Yasuhiko;冨田恭彦;Yasuhiko Tomida
洛克在论文中论证了指称理论框架内的抽象概念。在他看来，抽象观念在许多情况下是概念观念，起着“描述”或“描述性内容”的作用，决定着一般术语的指称。与此相反，贝克莱在《原理》的导言中，从意象主义的角度坚决否定洛克的抽象观念，提出了自己的指称理论，似乎仅由指称表达式及其指称物组成。然而，有趣的是，他提到了一个一般术语的“定义”，并暗示它决定了该术语所指的范围。例如，他将三角形定义为“由三条直线构成的平面”，并认为正如洛克对三角形的一般概念一样，定义决定了一般术语“三角形”的指称。他的定义提醒我们，正如笛卡尔把三角形的一般观念的内容理解为“一个由三条线包围的图形”，洛克把三角形的抽象观念理解为“一个包括三条线之间的空间的图形”等等，也就是说，贝克莱是一个意象主义者，他不承认洛克的概念抽象观念是“观念，虽然他口头上否认“抽象观念”，但他的指称理论实际上也有同样的指称主义框架，即指称表达，指称内容和指称对象。这样，我们就理解了贝克莱对洛克的批评为什么显得离题的真实的原因。
In theEssayLocke argues abstract ideas within the framework of the descriptivist theory of reference. For him, abstract ideas are, in many cases, conceptual ideas that play the role of “descriptions” or “descriptive contents,” determining general terms’ referents. In contrast, in the introduction of thePrinciples, Berkeley denies Lockean abstract ideas adamantly from an imagistic point of view, and he offers his own theory of reference seemingly consisting of referring expressions and their referents alone. However, interestingly, he mentions a general term’s “definition” and suggests that it determines the scope of the term’s referents. For example, he takes up the definition of a triangle as “a plain Surface comprehended by three right Lines” and suggests that just as Locke’s general idea of a triangle does, the definition determines the referents of the general term “triangle.” His definition reminds us of the fact that as Descartes grasps the content of the general idea of a triangle as “a figure enclosed by three lines,” so Locke grasps the abstract idea of a triangle as “a Figure including a Space between three Lines,” and so on. That is, since Berkeley is an imagist, he does not acknowledge Locke’s conceptual abstract ideas as “ideas,” but although he verbally denies “abstract ideas,” his theory of reference also actually has the same descriptivist framework consisting of referring expressions, their descriptive contents, and their referents. Thus, we understand the real reason why Berkeley’s criticism of Locke seems beside the point.