Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
Economic Incentives and the Defense Procurement Process
复制标题
经济激励和国防采购流程
DOI：
10.1257/jep.8.4.65
复制
发表时间：
1994
影响因子：
8.4
通讯作者：
W. Rogerson
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
W. Rogerson
本文介绍了一些见解，激励的经济理论可以有助于国防采购政策分析。它描述了形成国防采购问题的潜在激励问题，当前机构的性质以及它们如何影响参与者的行为，以及通过将其视为一组复杂的激励问题的解决方案来改进采购过程的可能方向。政府和国防企业之间的激励问题和政府内部的激励问题都被考虑。
This paper describes some of the insights that the economic theory of incentives can contribute to defense procurement policy analysis. It describes the underlying incentive problems that shape the defense procurement problem, the nature of current institutions and how they affect actors' behavior, and possible directions for improving the procurement process suggested by viewing it as a solution to a complex set of incentive problems. Incentive problems between government and defense firms and incentive problems within government are both considered.