Sabotage in Corporate Contests – An Experimental Analysis
Sabotage in Corporate Contests – An Experimental Analysis
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企业竞赛中的破坏行为——实验分析
DOI：
10.1080/13571510701597445
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发表时间：
2007
影响因子：
1.2
通讯作者：
R. Selten
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
C. Harbring;Bernd Irlenbusch;M. Kräkel;R. Selten
在企业竞赛中，员工为奖品而竞争。理想情况下，竞争会促使员工付出富有成效的努力，从而增加他们获胜的可能性。然而，在许多环境中，员工也可以通过伤害同事来提高自己的排名。企业竞争的这种负面激励效应在很大程度上尚未得到探索，这在一定程度上可以归因于这样一个事实，即在该领域几乎无法观察到破坏行为。在本研究中，我们分析了具有相互破坏能力的异质玩家在实验竞赛中的行为。研究发现，不同类型竞争对手的构成不同，破坏行为也有系统的变化。此外，如果破坏者的身份被揭露，破坏活动就会减少，报复动机就会占上风。我们的研究结果在设计公司竞赛时很有价值。
Abstract In corporate contests, employees compete for a prize. Ideally, contests induce employees to exert productive effort which increases their probability of winning. In many environments, however, employees can also improve their own ranking position by harming their colleagues. Such negative incentive effects of corporate contests are largely unexplored, which can partly be attributed to the fact that sabotaging behavior is almost unobservable in the field. In this study we analyze behavior in experimental contests with heterogeneous players who are able to mutually sabotage each other. We find that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of contestants. Moreover, if the saboteur’s identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail. Our results promise to be valuable when designing corporate contests.