Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment
Optimal risk regulation of monopolists with subjective risk assessment
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基于主观风险评估的垄断者最优风险监管
DOI：
10.1007/s11149-021-09429-0
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发表时间：
2021
影响因子：
1.1
通讯作者：
Daiki Kishishita and Susumu Sato
中科院分区：
文献类型：
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作者：
Yoshizawa Daisuke;Nakamoto Yuya;and Kagawa Shigemi;Takumi Kato;Ken Miura;Toshikuni Sato;Hirofumi Okoshi;Nguyen Thang DAO;Daiki Kishishita and Susumu Sato
本研究的特点是最优监管的风险活动时，事故的概率评估是主观的。利益相关者的乐观情绪形成了主观的风险感知，这在很大程度上影响了最佳干预。为了探讨这个问题，我们构建了一个道德风险模型与有限责任约束，其中利益相关者有异质性的信念事故的概率。首先，我们表明，垄断者的乐观情绪降低了预防工作的水平时，监管工具是固定的。然后，我们分析的情况下，监管机构可以设置罚款和产品价格作为监管工具。最优产品价格随着垄断者的乐观程度而增加，因为宽松的产品市场管制鼓励乐观垄断者的预防性努力。因此，在这样一个最佳方案下，垄断者乐观情绪的增加可能会增加预防努力的水平。
This study characterizes the optimal regulation of risky activities when the assessment of the probability of an accident is subjective. The optimism of stakeholders forms subjective risk perceptions, which substantially affect the optimal intervention. To explore this issue, we construct a moral hazard model with a limited liability constraint, where stakeholders have heterogeneous beliefs about the probability of an accident. First, we show that the optimism of a monopolist reduces the level of the preventive effort when regulatory instruments are fixed. We then analyze the case in which the regulator can set both a fine and a product price as regulatory instruments. The optimal product price increases with the monopolist’s degree of optimism, as the loose product market regulation encourages the preventive effort of the optimistic monopolist. Consequently, under such an optimal scheme, an increase in the optimism of the monopolist may increase the level of preventive effort.