Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information
Virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies: complete information
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迭代非支配策略中的虚拟实现：完整信息
DOI：
10.2307/2951536
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发表时间：
1992
期刊：
影响因子：
6.1
通讯作者：
Hitoshi Matsushima
中科院分区：
文献类型：
--
作者：
Dilip Abreu;Hitoshi Matsushima
作者研究了社会选择功能的实现，映射到彩票替代品。它们需要在迭代非劣策略中的虚拟实现。在非常弱的域限制下，他们表明，如果有三个或更多的球员，任何社会选择功能可以这样实现。在纳什均衡及其改进的实施文献是妥协的依赖与不自然的功能（例如，“整数游戏”）或“模”的结构与任意排除的混合策略的游戏形式。相比之下，作者的结果采用有限（因此“行为良好”）机制，并允许混合策略。版权所有1992年由计量经济学会。
The authors investigate the implementation of social choice functions that map to lotteries over alternatives. They require virtual implementation in iteratively undominated strategies. Under very weak domain restrictions, they show that if there are three or more players, any social choice function may be so implemented. The literature on implementation in Nash equilibrium and its refinements is compromised by its reliance on game forms with unnatural features (for example, "integer games") or "modulo" constructions with mixed strategies arbitrarily excluded. In contrast, the authors' results employ finite (consequently "well-behaved") mechanisms and allow for mixed strategies. Copyright 1992 by The Econometric Society.
影响因子：
6.1
作者：
HART, O;MOORE, J
通讯作者：
MOORE, J