Growing localization and fragmentation of patronal politics:Ukrainian local elections since 2010

Growing localization and fragmentation of patronal politics:Ukrainian local elections since 2010
复制标题

庇护政治日益本土化和碎片化:2010年以来的乌克兰地方选举

DOI:
10.1080/15387216.2021.1996255
复制
发表时间:
2021
影响因子:
3.8
通讯作者:
Torikai Masatomo
Torikai Masatomo
中科院分区:
经济学2区
文献类型:
--
作者:
原田佑規;大山潤爾;和田真;Torikai Masatomo

文献摘要

相似文献

乌克兰 2020 年地方选举通过地方政党的激增展现了政党制度的根本转变。虽然现有研究考察了政党制度的逐步国有化,但很少讨论政党制度本土化的迅速增加,如当今乌克兰所观察到的。结合2010年代政治进程的定性证据和对2010年、2015年和2020年乌克兰地方选举结果数据分析的定量证据,本研究表明政党制度本土化是由有影响力的市长在亲欧盟示威后迅速积累权力造成的。市长权力的增加有三个主要原因。首先,民众市长选举等制度设置以及市政府在国家结构中的相对自治权为市长提供了与州长等其他地区行为者不同的独特权力。其次,亲欧盟示威后启动的权力下放改革赋予了市长和市政府权力。最后,弗拉基米尔·泽连斯基的州长招募模式和他的政党“人民公仆”候选人选举程序使市长们能够培养自己的地方权力基础。这项研究通过表明庇护政治的地理碎片化,为庇护主义的理念提供了重要的启示。
Ukraine’s 2020 local elections showed a radical transformation of the party system through the proliferation of local parties. While extant studies have examined the gradual nationalization of the party system, the rapid increase in party system localization, as observed in present-day Ukraine, has rarely been discussed. Combining qualitative evidence on the 2010s’ political processes and quantitative evidence from data analysis of Ukraine’s local election results in 2010, 2015, and 2020, this study demonstrates that party system localization was caused by influential mayors who rapidly accumulated power after the Euromaidan. This increase in mayoral authority has three main causes. First, institutional settings such as popular mayoral elections and the relative autonomy of city governments in the state structure provide mayors with unique powers at odds with other regional actors, such as the governors. Second, the decentralization reform initiated after the Euromaidan empowered mayors and city governments. Finally, Volodymyr Zelens’kyi’s recruitment pattern of governors and his party Servant of the People’s candidate selection process enabled mayors to cultivate their local power bases. This study offers an important implication for the idea of patronalism by indicating the geographical fragmentation of patronal politics.