Cooperation of Nodes. In: L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux (eds.), Report on a Working Session on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
Cooperation of Nodes. In: L. Buttyan and J.-P. Hubaux (eds.), Report on a Working Session on Security in Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
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发表时间：
2002
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通讯作者：
S. Buchegger;J. L. Boudec
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作者：
S. Buchegger;J. L. Boudec
在移动的ad-hoc网络中，节点之间需要协作进行通信，但不协作的原因很多。节省电力或防止其他节点阻碍服务仅仅是不合作的自私原因，而节点也可能主动和恶意地拒绝服务或转移各种攻击的流量。然而，如果没有基础设施的依赖，节点依赖于彼此的合作。用博弈论的术语来说，这是一个两难的问题。单个节点的主导策略是不合作，因为合作消耗资源并且可能导致不利。但是，如果每个节点都遵循这种策略，那么结果对每个人来说都是不可取的，因为它会导致一个不起作用或完全不存在的网络。我们的目标是通过主动给予自私节点合作的激励来增加合作，以及被动地隔离自私或恶意节点，使它们无法继续其不当行为。为了使移动的ad-hoc网络中的合作具有吸引力，我们必须确保自私行为，即，使节点效用最大化的行为导致对网络也有益的结果。
In mobile ad-hoc networks nodes need to cooperate to communicate, but there are many reasons for non-cooperation. Saving power or preventing other nodes from obstructing a service are merely selfish reasons for non-cooperation, whereas nodes may also actively and maliciously deny service or divert traffic for all sorts of attacks. However, without an infrastructure to rely on, nodes depend on each other`s cooperation. In game-theoretic terms, this is a dilemma. The dominating strategy for individual nodes is not to cooperate, as cooperation consumes resources and it might result in a disadvantage. But if every node follows that strategy, the outcome is undesirable for everyone as it results in a non functional or entirely absent network. Our goals are to increase cooperation by proactively giving selfish nodes an incentive to cooperate, as well as reactively isolate selfish or malicious nodes such that they cannot continue their misbehavior. To make cooperation in mobile ad-hoc networks attractive we have to make sure that selfish behavior, i.e., a behavior that maximizes the utility of a node, leads to an outcome that is also beneficial for the network.